Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02187 01 OF 03 221746Z

46
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 MC-02 OMB-01 /064 W
---------- 122625
R 221554Z APR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1330
SECDEF
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
CSAF
CINCUSAFE
ALL NATO CAPITALS 5248

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2187

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, NAC, MPOL, BEXP
SUBJECT: NAC MEETING 16 APR 75: AGENDA ITEM II - NATO AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM

REF: USNATO 2095

TEXT OF SYG LUNS' INTRODUCTION AND DR TUCKER'S PRESENTATION TO THE 16 APR 75 NAC FOLLOW:

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, MR. LUNS:

THE PRINCIPAL ITEM ON OUR AGENDA TODAY IS A REPORT FROM THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENCE SUPPORT ON THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF A NATO AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE FORCE GOALS ESTABLISHED IN THE 1974 DEFENCE PLANNING REVIEW CLASSIFIED THE NEED FOR AN AIRBORNE WARNING CAPABILITY AS A PRIORITY I ITEM FOR ALL COUNTRIES.

YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT DEFENCE MINISTERS HAVE,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02187 01 OF 03 221746Z

AT THEIR LAST TWO MEETINGS, APPROVED A SHORT LIST OF AREAS ON WHICH THEY WOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION, AND THAT THE AIRBORNE RADAR CAPABILITY HEADS THAT LIST.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS AND THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE COMMISSIONED AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF THIS REQUIREMENT AND ITS POSSIBLE SATISFACTION. I EXPECT THAT THE CNAD WILL SEEK THE ENDORSEMENT OF MINISTERS THIS MAY FOR THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THEY REACH IN THEIR MEETING NEXT WEEK. I ALSO EXPECT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO MAKE THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS MATTER TO THE MINISTERS.

BECAUSE THE TIME BETWEEN THE CNAD MEETING AND THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS WILL BE SHORT, I HAVE ASKED DR. TUCKER TO GIVE US A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THIS ISSUE.

STATEMENT BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENCE SUPPORT, DR. TUCKER:

THE CNAD AND THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE INDEED BEEN EXAMINING CAREFULLY IN THE PAST TWO YEARS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A NATO AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SATISFYING THOSE REQUIREMENTS. THIS WORK HAS INVOLVED SEVERAL OF THE BODIES UNDER THE CNAD AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

IN PARTICULAR, THE CNAD LAST OCTOBER COMMISSIONED A "HIGH LEVEL GROUP" OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS TO CONSIDER HOW NATO MIGHT APPROACH THE ACQUISITION OF SUCH SYSTEMS.

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP WILL MAKE ITS REPORT TO THE CNAD NEXT WEEK AND WILL RECOMMEND TO THE CNAD THAT IT ESTABLISH A FULL-TIME PROJECT GROUP COMPOSED OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON LOAN FROM INTERESTED NATIONS AND SUPPORTED BY INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS PREFINANCED BY INTERESTED NATIONS, WHOSE PURPOSE WILL BE TO DEVELOP A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL TO PUT BEFORE MINISTERS IN DECEMBER. AS A PART OF THIS PROPOSAL, MINISTERS MIGHT BE ASKED IN DECEMBER TO DECIDE WHETHER TO FUND THE PROCUREMENT OF LONG LEAD-TIME ITEMS FOR PRODUCTION, AND THEY MIGHT BE ASKED TO MAKE A FINAL PROCUREMENT DECISION IN JUNE OF 1976.

IF THE CNAD ACCEPTS THIS RECOMMENDATION THEY WILL WANT THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE MINISTERS FOR THE TIMETABLE FOR CONFIDENTIAL

DECISIONS AND THE JOINT EFFORT TO PREPARE THE PROPOSAL.

TO EXPLAIN WHY AN AIRBORNE WARNING CAPABILITY HAS BEEN GIVEN PRIORITY I IN THE FORCE GOALS, I WOULD REMIND YOU THAT, IN 1960, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL APPROVED THE CONCEPT OF AN INTEGRATED NATO EUROPEAN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM UNDER UNIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL IN PEACETIME AS WELL AS WARTIME. THE REASON WAS THAT THE AIR THREAT COULD ATTACK SUDDENLY AND HAD THE FLEXIBILITY TO ATTACK IN ANY REGION OF THE FRONTIER, SO THAT THE CAPABILITY FOR A VERY RAPID AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BY OUR DEFENSIVE FORCES WAS ESSENTIAL. THE NADGE NETWORK OF FIXED RADARS, COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WAS ESTABLISHED ALONG OUR FRONTIER, AND PROVIDES GOOD DETECTION AND TRACKING OF AIRCRAFT FLYING ABOVE A FEW THOUSAND FEET ALTITUDE. THIS

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

SYSTEM PROVIDES WARNING OF AN APPROACHING ATTACK AT THESE
ALTITUDES AND ALLOWS US TO SCRAMBLE OUR INTERCEPTORS AND
DIRECT THEM TO THE ATTACKING AIRCRAFT SO THAT THE DEFENCE
CAN BE FOUGHT FAR FORWARD.
  THERE IS, HOWEVER, A GAP IN OUR RADAR COVERAGE AT
LOW LEVELS. THIS OCCURS BECAUSE THE RADARS ARE ON THE GROUND
AND THEY ARE, THEREFORE, MASKED BY THE CONTOUR OF THE TERRAIN
OR BY THE ORIZON SO THAT THEY CANNOT DETECT OR TRACK AIRCRAFT
FLYING BELOW A FEW THOUSAND FEET.
  IN THE 1960S, FEW ATTACK AIRCRAFT WERE ABLE TO OPERATE
EFFICIENTLY AT ALTITUDES BELOW A FEW THOUSAND FEET. TODAY,
HOWEVER, BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT INVENTORIES CONTAIN A GROWING
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF FLYING LONG RANGES AT HIGH
SPEEDS AT LOW ALTITUDES. THIS MEANS THAT WITH SUCH LOW-FLYING
ATTACKERS WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SCRAMBLE OUR INTERCEPTORS
SOON ENOUGH AS TO DIRECT THEM TOWARDS THE ATTACKERS. THE
RESULT IS THAT A GREATER PART OF THE DEFENCE BURDENS MUST
BE BORNE BY OUR SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND THE SHORT-RANGE
AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS CLUSTERED ABOUT INTERIOR HIGH VALUE
TARGETS, SO THAT THE LINE OF DEFENCE IS PUSHED FURTHER BACK INTO
NATO TERRITORY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 02187 02 OF 03 221801Z

46
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

    ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

    SAJ-01 MC-02 OMB-01 /064 W
                ----------   122883
R 221554Z APR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1331
SECDEF
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
CSAF
CINCUSAFE
ALL NATO CAPITALS 5249

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 2187

THUS THE GAP IN OUR RADAR COVERAGE AT LOW LEVEL HAS
THREE CONSEQUENCES:

1. THE TOTALITY OF OUR AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS (INTERCEPTORS,
MISSILES, ETC.) ARE INEFFICIENTLY USED;
2. THERE IS INCREASED DAMAGE TO HIGH VALUE INTERIOR

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

TARGETS (AIR BASES, COMMAND POSTS, MILITARY AND
CIVIL POPULATIONS, ETC.);
3. OUR OWN ATTACK AIRCRAFT ON COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
MISSIONS CANNOT BE WARNED OF APPROACHING INTERCEPTORS
OR DIVERTED, SO THEY ARE PUT IN JEOPARDY.

THIS GAP IS THE MOST SERIOUS DEFICIENCY IN NADGE,
AND POSSIBLY THE MOST SERIOUS VULNERABILITY OF THE ENTIRE
NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE.
THERE IS A SIMILAR PROBLEM AT SEA. SHIPBORNE RADARS
ARE CLOSE TO THE OCEAN SURFACE AND, THEREFORE, HAVE A LIMITED
HORIZON FOR LOW-FLYING OBJECTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED IN
QUANTITY ANTI-SHIPPING MISSILES WHICH CRUISE AT VERY LOW
ALTITUDES AND CAN BE LAUNCHED FROM BEYOND THE RADAR HORIZON.
CONFIDENTIAL

OUR SHIPS' CLOSE-IN DEFENCES AGAINST SUCH MISSILES ARE POOR.
THE BEST DEFENCE IS TO DESTROY THE PLATFORMS BEFORE THE MISSILES
ARE LAUNCED. TO DO THIS WE MUST EXTEND OUR RADAR RANGE. NOW
AIRCRAFT WITH APPROPRIATE RADARS ARE BEING DEPLOYED ABOARD
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, SO THAT THE RADAR RANGE OF CARRIER TASK
FORCES IS ADEQUATELY EXTENDED. SHIPS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH
CARRIER TASK FORCES, HOWEVER, NEED LAND-BASED AIRBORNE RADARS
ON PATROL TO PROVIDE THEIR COVERAGE.
THE GAP IN OUR RADAR COVERAGE HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR A
LONG TIME. IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, A SOLUTION HAS NOT BEEN
TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE. NOW THERE ARE NEW AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEMS
IN PRODUCTION OR ENTERING DEVELOPMENT. THE CNAD BODIES HAVE,
FURTHERMORE, BEEN CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF NATO AIR
DEFENCE FOR THE 1980S, INCLUDING THE ENTIRE MIX OF WEAPON
SYSTEMS - REPLACEMENTS FOR CURRENT INTERCEPTORS, NEW AIR-TO-
AIR MISSILES NEW SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES TO REPLACE HAWK OR
HIP OR NIKE, SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENCE MISSILES ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
WHICH MUST BE ACQUIRED OR MAINTAINED. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED
THAT AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEMS MUST BE INCLUDED IN A COST-
EFFECTIVE MIX OF SYSTEMS. THE REASONS ARE THAT INCLUSION OF
AIRBORNE RADARS WILL:
1. RESULT IN MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE TOTALITY OF
DEFENSIVE WEAPONS;
2. KEEP THE LINE OF DEFENCE FORWARD;
3. LOWER THE DAMAGE TO HIGH VALUE TARGETS ON LAND AND
AT SEA;
4. IMPROVE THE SURVIVABILITY AND HENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF OUR ATTACK AIRCRAFT;
5. PROVIDE MORE CONFIDENT WARNING OF WARSAW PACT FORWARD
DEPLOYMENT OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS (AS THESE
AIRBORNE RADARS CAN LOOK DOWN INTO WARSAW PACT
TERRITORY AND DETECT AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS AT ALL
LEVELS).
THE FIRST THREE OF THESE POINTS ARE ILLUSTRATED BY A
SHAPE TECHNICAL CENTRE STUDY OF ONE SCENARIO INVOLVING AN AIR
ATTACK IN THE CENTRAL REGION, IN WHICH THE NUMBER OF WARSAW

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

PACK ATTACKERS PENETRATING TO INTEROR TARGETS WAS REDUCED BY
1/4 TO 1/3 AS A RESULT OF INCLUDING AN AIRBORNE RADAR CAPABILITY
IN OUR DEFENCES, AND THE NUMBER OF ATTACKERS ACTUALLY ENGAGED
BY NATO INTERCEPTORS WAS INCREASED BY 1/3 TO 2/3.
  IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS THE THREE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02187 02 OF 03 221801Z

NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE DEVELOPED A COMMON STATEMENT OF
BASIC MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR THESE SYSTEMS.
  UNLIKE MOST OF THE WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH MUST BE
ACQUIRED FOR AIR DEFENCE IN THE 1980S, THE COST OF THESE
AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEMS PROBABLY PUTS THEM BEYOND THE REACH OF
MOST INDIVIDUAL NATIONS. LIKE NADGE, THEY WOULD BENEFIT THE
WHOLE ALLIANCE. THEREFORE, THEY ARE LOGICAL CANDIDATES FOR A
COMMON, CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT.
  THE CNAD HAS BEEN EXAMINING THREE CANDIDATE SYSTEMS,
ONE DERIVED FROM THE USAF "AWACS", ONE FROM THE CARRIER-BASED
"E2C", ONE FROM THE UK "NIMROD". THE CNAD HAS INITIATED THE
WORK NECESSARY TO SELECT A SYSTEM AND DEVELOP A SPECIFIC
PROGRAMME FOR PROPOSAL TO MINISTERS.
  I MUST, HOWEVER, DISCUSS THE COST OF SUCH A SYSTEM.
THE LARGEST DETERMINANT OF COST WILL BE THE EXTENT OF RADAR
COVERAGE TO BE PROVIDED. THIS WILL DEPEND ON THE FINAL STATE-
MENT OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND UPON A DECISION ON THE EXTENT
TO WHICH WE WILL PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO FULFILL THSE REQUIRE-
MENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY.
  THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WILL DEPEND ON THE SYSTEM
CHOSEN. AS AN EXAMPLE, A FLEET OF 36 OF THE AWACS AIRCRAFT,
WHICH COULD PROBABLY FULFILL SEVERAL, BUT CERTAINLY NOT ALL,
REQUIREMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY, WOULD HAVE A TOTAL PROCUREMENT
COST OF ABOUT $1,700 MILLION. A FLEET OF 12 SUCH AIRCRAFT,
WHICH COULD PERFORM SELECTED MISSIONS ON A FLEXIBLE BASIS,
WOULD COST ABOUT $700 MILLION. EITHER OF THE OTHER CANDIDATE
SYSTEMS WOULD COST LESS PER AIRCRAFT, BUT MORE AIRCRAFT WOULD
BE NEEDED TO GIVE COMPARABLE COVERAGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 02187 03 OF 03 221808Z

46
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

    NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

    SS-15 NSC-05 MC-02 OMB-01 /064 W
                ----------------------   123054
R 221554Z APR 75
FM USMISSION NATO

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1332
SECDEF
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
CSAF
CINCUSAFE
ALL NATO CAPITALS 5250

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 2187

ADDITIONAL COSTS OF $50-100 MILLION WOULD BE NEEDED FOR EQUIPMENT ON THE GROUND TO TIE THE AIRBORNE SYSTEMS INTO THE NADGE AND NAVAL AIR DEFENCE NETWORKS.

CLEARLY, IF NATO DOES UNDERTAKE THIS PROGRAMME, IT WILL BE THE LARGEST SINGLE COMMON PROJECT WE HAVE YET LAUNCED.

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP APPOINTED BY THE CNAD LAST FALL TO EXAMINE HOW TO APPROACH ACQUISITION BASED ITS WORK ON THREE ASSUMPTIONS:

1. THE NATO NATIONS WILL AGREE ON A FIRM MILITARY REQUIREMENT;
2. THE PRIORITY GIVEN TO THE REQUIREMENT WILL JUSTIFY THE ACQUISTION OF A SYSTEM;
3. ALL NATO NATIONS WILL WISH TO BENEFIT FROM THE SYSEM AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAMME.

BASED ON THESE ASSUMPTIONS, THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP RECOMMENDS COMMON FUNDING BY ALL NATIONS OF BOTH PROCUREMENT AND OPERATING COSTS. THEY RECOMMEND THIS PROJECT SHOULD BE SEPARATE FROM THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAME, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE GROUND FACILITIES, BUT THE MAJORITY FELT THE INFRASTRUCTURE COST-SHARING FORMULA SHOULD BE USED AS THE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02187 03 OF 03 221808Z

STARTING POINT FOR DETERMINING NATIONAL SHARES.

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP RECOMMENDS THE SYSTEM BE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND THAT IT BE OWNED BY NATO. ON THIS LAST POINT WE SOUGHT ADVICE FROM NATO AND NATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES, AND LEARNED THAT THERE ARE NO LEGAL BARRIERS TO A COMMONLY FUNDED AND OWNED FORCE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A MAJOR NATO COMMANDER, PROVIDED THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT IS REGISTERED IN A MEMBER COUNTRY AND A MEMBER OF THE CREW FROM THAT COUNTRY IS DESIGNATED AS CAPTAIN OF THE AEROPLANE.

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES RECOMMEND A SINGLE HOME BASE WITH COMMON MAINTENACE AND SUPPORT, TOGETHER WITH A FEW FORWARD OPERATING BASES, AS THE MOST ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT ARRANGEMENT. (QUESTIONS OF ASSURED OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS COULD NECESSITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO HOME BASES).

PRODUCTION SHARING AND PAYMENT BALANCES ARE CLEARLY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS. FOR NONE OF THE CANDIDATE SYSTEMS ARE THE PRODUCPION-SHARING POSSIBILITIES SO FAR IDENTIFIED VERY LARGE. THIS IS AN AREA WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED IN THE

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS WHICH SUPPORT THE PREPARATION OF A FIRM PROPOSAL. THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP HAS URGED THAT SPECIAL CARE BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE SMALLER NATIONS RECEIVE A FULL SHARE OF THE COMMON WORK, AND THAT OFFSETS BE DEVELOPED FOR PAYMENTS IMBALANCES CREATED BY THIS PROGRAMME. THESE ARE TASKS TO BE ADDRESSED DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS.

SUMMARY

THE STUDIES WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST TWO YEARS UNDER THE CNAD AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS A VERY SERIOUS GAP IN OUR AIR DEFENCE COVERAGE- POSSIBLY THE MOST SERIOUS DEFICIENCY IN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. WE HAVE EXAMINED CANDIDATE SYSTEMS FOR CLOSING THIS GAP AND FOUND THEM TO BE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE. WE HAVE EXAMINED THE IMPACT THEY WOULD HAVE ON OUR TOTAL DEFENCES AND FOUND THEM TO BE COST EFFECTIVE. THE NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE GENERATED A COMMON STATEMENT OF BASIS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. THESE CONCLUSIONS AND THIS STATEMENT WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE CNAD AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND THEIR FINDINGS WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU FOR CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS.
CONFIDENTIAL

THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SPECIFIC, QUANTITATIVE PROPOSAL, OR ONE WITH SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES, FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION IN DECEMBER. THSE PROPOSALS COULD CALL FOR AN INITIAL COMMITMENT OF FUNDS IN DECEMBER AND A FINAL PROCUREMENT DISCUSSION IN JUNE OF 1976. I BELIEVE THE CNAD MAY INITIATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, AND ASK THE ENDORESEMENT OF MINISTERS IN MAY.

IF NATO DOES INITIATE A COMMON PROGRAMME FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT WILL BE THE LARGEST SINGLE COMMONLY FUNDED PROGRAMME SO FAR UNDERTAKEN IN NATO. FOR THIS REASON, AND BECAUSE THE TIME BETWEEN CNAD AND MC REVIEW OF THIS SUBJECT AND THEIR REPORTING TO THE MINISTERS IS SHORT, WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO GIVE YOU AN INTRODUCTORY BRIEFING TODAY.THANK YOU. BRUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO02187
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197504101/abbrzjnc.tel
Line Count: 365
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 2095
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <23 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAC MEETING 16 APR 75: AGENDA ITEM II - NATO AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM
TAGS: NATO, NAC, MPOL, BEXP
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
CSAF
CINCUSAFE
ALL NATO CAPITALS

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006